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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 01/02/2008

Accident number: 544

Accident time: 12:00

Accident Date: 02/03/2004

Where it occurred: Ward 18, Dehsabz,
Kabul Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: None

Name of source: [Name removed]

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Flare/ Ordnance

Ground condition: demolition site
(explosives)
dry/dusty
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 01/02/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in January 2008 by the demining group
involved. Its conversion to a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.
The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original file is held
on record. Text in [ ] is editorial.

ACCIDENT REPORT
[Demining group], KABUL SEPTEMBER 2003

1. Objectives.
The objectives with the current report are:
To deliver the evidences to other staff within the organization.
To draw the attention of other staff to 100% implementation of standards.

2. General Information.
Team/Site description: The incident happened with two deminers of EOD 8 during BAC of
CDS after the demolition.
Location of accident: Ward 18 Dehsabz, Kabul Province
Date & Time: March 2, 2004 at 12:00 hrs local time
3. Particulars of injured person:
Name: [Removed]
Title: Deminer
Date of birth: 1978
Place of birth: Kandahar
Blood group: B Rh –

Name: [Removed]
Title: Deminer
Date of birth:1976
Place of birth: Kandahar
Blood group: AB Rh -

4. Cause of the accident:
Refer to the statement given by injured deminers, they were doing the BAC of the surrounding
areas of the CDS after the demolition of 400 flares and one engine of Oragan Rocket that was
demolished in two different pits. While collecting the demolished flares and scraps he touched
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a flare that was half buried in the ground and when he left, it got fire and burnt his face and
fore arms. The accident point is almost 20 meters far from the demolition pits.

5. Brief description of injuries:
[Victim No.1] has 3rd degree severe burn in his face, both forearms and right leg.
[Victim No.2] has 4th degree minor burn in his face and right forearm.

6. Chronological Overview of the Accident.
Following describes the actions taken and the instructions given directly after the accident:
At 1200 the accident happened .
The nearest deminer of the same EOD team heard the incident and rushed to the incident
point. +05 sec.
Paramedic started treating and doing the first aid to the injured.

+60 sec.

Radio room of OPSC got the report. +3 min.
The injured Deminers were shifted to the ambulance after first aid and dressing +05 min.
A delegation left from Kabul toward CDS for initial investigation. +15 min.
Operations were standing by in Bagram and Kabul. +45 min.
SOO, TCM, Tech. Advisors left for the CDS to investigate the accident. +38 min.
Arrival of injured from CDS to Emergency hospital in Kabul. +54 min.
The emergency hospital considered the injured as ODP patients and did not accept them
because of minor injuries and were shifted back to office. +64 min.
The delegation of initial investigation arrived back to OPSC. +120 min
The country director together with the delegation met the injured in office. + 180 min
The accident was reported to UNMACA and [Demining group] Islamabad. +190 min
The injured were treated by MO in office and were sent back to Bagram base.

+ 240 min

7. Brief description of how the accident happened:
The section leader 5 minutes after the demolition went to the demolition area for checking of
the success demolition. When he was assured that the demolition is successful and there is
no smoke and sound in the area he called the deminers who were looking for the security of
the CDS to come and start the BAC of the surrounding areas. The deminers started BAC in a
straight line with 2 meters in between each of them after 15 minutes from the demolition time.
Approximately 20% of the area that they were doing BAC were checked which took 5
minutes. [Victim No.1] was the first man from the right and J[Victim No.2] was on his left
while two other deminers were beside them.
During the BAC operations while they were collecting the fragments and scraps [Victim No.1]
found a flare that was not smoking and sound and were half buried in the ground. When he
picked up the flare by his right hand it took fire and burnt his face and forearms. As the fire
was strong it burnt face of [Victim No.2] too.
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General Condition of the injured persons:
The deminers were feeling well and they were not admitted in Emergency Hospital because
of minor burnt in their bodies. They were prescribed some medicines by the medical officer
and were shifted to Bagram Compound for rest.

8. Damaged Equipment:
In this incident the uniform and the gloves of the deminers were damaged.

9. Technical Evidence
Based on the findings of investigation team from the accident point and shrapnel taken out
from the wounds of the deminer, a flare has got fire and caused the injuries.

Treatment:
The 1 DM, 2 PAMs performed first aid in the accident, stabilized and prepared the injured for
evacuation - more specifically:
- Put gel on the burnt area.
- Prescribed some medicines.

Summary:
Summarizing all factors mentioned above some procedures or regulations have been violated
according to the current Demining SOPs within [Demining group]. Unfortunately there are no
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eyewitnesses to the accident except the injured deminers them selves and the statement of
them is not answering all the questions raised.
As the flare was kicked out from the demolition and the possibility of risk was still in place
therefore, the deminers should not touch the kicked out UXO without the permission of team
or section leader. And also they must keep the specific distance between each other while
doing BAC after the demolition.

Victim Report
Victim number: 717

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 25

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available,

Time to hospital: 54 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
minor Arms
minor Face
minor Leg
COMMENT: "3rd degree severe burn in his face, both forearms and right leg." No Medical
report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 718

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 27

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available.

Time to hospital: 54 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
minor Arm
minor Face
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because Victim No.1
should not have picked up the thrown-out flare but apparently did not realise that this was
dangerous. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because if Victim
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No.1 had been appropriately trained, he was not appropriately controlled while working in the
field.
The Victims were working without PPE. This is presumed because of the injuries received
and the fact that their uniforms were damaged but no PPE was damaged. The photograph of
the investigation showed men without PPE. It may be that the demining group performed
BAC and ordnance disposal tasks without wearing PPE, and that this was approved by the
National Authority. However, given that most UXO accidents involve fuzes, it would always be
worth wearing PPE.
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